This compilation presents translated excerpts from the works of three eminent Shāfiʿī jurists whose intellectual legacies have profoundly shaped the legal and theological contours of the Shāfiʿī school and exerted considerable influence on broader Islamic thought, not least in political theory. The selected scholars—al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)—offer pivotal insights into the concept of the imamate and the communal obligation to uphold legitimate leadership. Their writings collectively underscore the centrality of political authority in maintaining social cohesion and in actualizing the higher objectives of the sharīʿa.

The excerpts from al-Māwardī are drawn from two of his most influential works: al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya, a seminal treatise on Islamic governance and legal theory, and Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā, a text concerned with ethical and social conduct. As a pioneering figure in Islamic political theory and public law, al-Māwardī’s contributions have left an enduring imprint on classical Islamic scholarship. His discussions articulate the theological and legal foundations of the imamate, emphasize the practical necessity of established authority for the preservation of order, and enumerate the responsibilities incumbent upon the Imam in overseeing public affairs. While all three scholars address the responsibilities of the imamate, this study focuses specifically on al-Māwardī’s enumeration of ten essential functions. To enhance accessibility and scholarly utility, explanatory annotations accompany the translation, offering both contextual and interpretive insights.

The article continues with translated passages from Ghiyāth al-Umam fī iltiyāth al-Ẓulam, a key work on constitutional theory by al-Juwaynī, a contemporary of al-Māwardī. Al-Juwaynī composed this treatise with two principal aims: to examine scenarios involving the absence of a recognized leader and the scarcity of qualified jurists. His analysis offers sophisticated treatment of the structural and normative dimensions of the imamate, which comprise a substantial portion of the work. A notable feature of his methodology is his differentiation between definitive (qaṭʿī) and probable (ẓannī) rulings—an implicit critique of al-Māwardī’s framework in al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya.¹ To support a more nuanced reading, reference has been made to al-Juwaynī’s other major works, including Nihāyat al-Maṭlab (a comprehensive legal compendium) and al-Irshād (a foundational theological treatise), with relevant commentarial notes included.²

The final excerpt is drawn from al-Ghazālī’s theological treatise, al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād. Although al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī themselves maintain that the imamate properly falls under the domain of substantive law (fiqh), it has nevertheless been treated extensively within the discipline of theology (kalām). This interdisciplinary overlap reflects the imamate’s doctrinal weight and the contentious debates it has generated throughout Islamic intellectual history, with divergent positions on the subject often serving as markers of theological and sectarian identity.

While al-Iqtiṣād offers a systematic discussion of the imamate, a more polemical and extensive treatment appears in Faḍāʾiḥ al-Bāṭiniyya, wherein al-Ghazālī critiques the Ismāʿīlī doctrine of divinely-appointed Imams. He contrasts it with the Sunni principle of communal designation and defends the legitimacy of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustaẓhir (d. 512/1118) over the Fatimid ruler al-Mustanṣir Billāh (d. 487/1094). Rejecting the notion of divinely mandated leadership, al-Ghazālī marshals theological and legal evidence to reinforce the communal obligation to appoint an Imām—an argument also articulated in al-Iqtiṣād. This translation relies primarily on the Arabic edition and commentary by the contemporary Azharite scholar Muṣṭafā ʿImrān (d. 1434/2013). Additional references have been drawn from other theological and juridical works by al-Ghazālī to contextualize his views.

 

Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya

فإنّ اللّه جلَّتْ قدرتُه نَدَبَ للأمّة زعيمًا خلَفَ به النبوةَ، وحاطَ به الملّةَ، وفوّضَ إليه السياسةَ؛ ليصدرَ التدبيرُ عن دينٍ مشروعٍ، وتجتمعَ الكلمةُ على رأيٍ متبوعٍ، فكانت الإمامةُ أصلًا عليه استقرتْ قواعدُ الملّة، وانتظمتْ به مصالحُ الأمّة حتى استثبتتْ بها الأمورُ العامةُ، وصدرتْ عنها الولاياتُ الخاصةُ، فلَزِمَ تقديمُ حُكمِها على كلِّ حكمٍ سلطانيٍّ، ووجبَ ذكرُ ما اختصَّ بنظرِها على كلِّ نظرٍ دينيٍّ؛ لترتيبِ أحكامِ الولاياتِ على نَسَقٍ متناسبِ الأقسامِ، متشاكلِ الأحكام.

Indeed, Allah—exalted be His power—obligated the Umma to appoint a leader to succeed the Prophet e, safeguard the religion, and govern the community. This leadership ensures that administration proceeds in accordance with the revealed way of life and that communal unity is anchored in an authoritative position. The imamate thus serves as the foundational institution upon which the pillars of the religion rest and through which the interests of the Umma are effectively ordered. It is through the imamate that public affairs are stabilized, and specific offices are administered with proper structure.³ For this reason, it is necessary to begin with a discussion of the imamate before addressing any other rulings related to political authority, and to first address those matters that fall within its jurisdiction before turning to any other religious inquiry—so that the rulings governing various political offices can be presented in a coherent and systematically organized framework.⁴

الإمامة موضوعةٌ لخلافةِ النبوةِ في حراسةِ الدينِ وسياسةِ الدنيا، وعقدُها لمن يقومُ بها في الأمة واجبٌ بالإجماعِ وإن شذَّ عنهم الأصمّ. واختُلف في وجوبِها: هل وجبت بالعقلِ أو بالشرعِ؟ فقالت طائفةٌ وجبت بالعقلِ لما في طباعِ العقلاءِ من التسليمِ لزعيمٍ يمنعُهم من التظالمِ، ويفصلُ بينهم في التنازعِ والتخاصمِ، ولولا الولاةُ لكانوا فوضى مهمَلين، وهمجًا مضاعين، وقد قال الأفوه الأودي، وهو شاعرٌ جاهليٌّ:

لَا يَصْلُحُ النَّاسُ فَوْضَى لَا سَرَاةَ لَهُمْ … وَلَا سَرَاةٌ إذَا جُهَّالُهُمْ سَادُوا

The imamate is instituted as a succession to prophethood in preserving the religion and administering worldly affairs.⁵ Appointing someone to undertake this role within the Muslim Umma is an obligation by consensus, notwithstanding the dissenting view of al-Aṣamm.⁶ Scholars have differed over the basis of this obligation: is it established by reason or by revelation? One group argues that it is necessitated by reason, due to the natural inclination of rational individuals to submit to a leader who restrains them from mutual injustice and adjudicates their disputes and conflicts. Without rulers, people would be left in disorder and neglect, resembling scattered and unruly mobs. As the pre-Islamic poet, al-Afwah al-Awdī said:

People do not prosper in chaos without a leader
And there is no leadership when the ignorant take charge.⁷

 

وقالت طائفةٌ أخرى: بل وجبت بالشرعِ دون العقلِ؛ لأن الإمامَ يقومُ بأمورٍ شرعيةٍ قد كان مجوَّزًا في العقلِ أن لا يردَ التعبُّدُ بها، فلم يكنِ العقلُ موجبًا لها، وإنما أوجبَ العقلُ أن يمنعَ كلُّ واحدٍ نفسَه من العقلاءِ عن التظالمِ والتقاطعِ، ويأخذَ بمقتضى العدلِ في التناصفِ والتواصلِ، فيتدبَّرُ بعقلِه لا بعقلِ غيرِه، ولكنْ جاء الشرعُ بتفويضِ الأمورِ إلى وليِّه في الدينِ، قال اللهُ – عز وجل: {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ}، ففرضَ علينا طاعةَ أولي الأمرِ فينا، وهم الأئمةُ المتأمِّرون علينا. وروى هشام بن عروةَ عن أبي صالحٍ عن أبي هريرةَ أن رسولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: «سيَليكم بعدي وُلاة، فيَليكم البرّ ببرّه، ويَليكم الفاجر بفجوره، فاسمعوا لهم وأطيعوا في كلّ ما وافق الحقّ، فإنْ أحسنوا فلكم ولهم، وإنْ أساءوا فلكم وعليهم».

Another group maintains that the obligation of the imamate is established exclusively by revelation, not by reason. Their argument is that the Imam undertakes duties prescribed by the sharīʿa—duties which, from the standpoint of pure reason, might not necessarily be mandated, as it is conceivable that no divine command regarding them is issued. Accordingly, reason does not require the imamate. What reason does require, they argue, is that every rational person restrain themselves from injustice and social discord, uphold justice in mutual dealings and cooperation, and act in accordance with their own rational discernment, rather than relying on the judgement of another. Revelation, however, introduced the principle of delegating authority to a leader. As Allah, the Exalted, says: “O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.”⁸ So He made obligatory upon us obedience to those in authority among us, and they are the imams who have assumed authority over us.

Hishām ibn ʿUrwa narrated from Abu Ṣāliḥ, from Abu Hurayra, that the Messenger of Allah e said:⁹ “You will be ruled after me by governors—some righteous and others corrupt. Listen to them and obey them in all that accords with the truth. If they act justly, it will be to your benefit and theirs. If they act unjustly, the burden will be upon them while the reward remains yours.”¹⁰

والذي يَلزمه من الأمور العامّة عشرة أشياء:

أحدها: حفظ الدين على أصوله المستقرّة، وما أجمع عليه سلف الأمّة، فإن نجم مبتدع أو زاغ ذو شبهةٍ عنه، أوضح له الحجة، وبيَّن له الصواب، وأخذه بما يَلزمه من الحقوق والحدود؛ ليكونَ الدين محروسًا من خَلل، والأمة ممنوعة من زَلل.

والثاني: تنفيذ الأحكام بين المتشاجرين، وقطع الخصام بين المتنازعين حتى تَعُمَّ النَصَفَة، فلا يتعدى ظالمٌ، ولا يَضعف مظلومٌ.

والثالث: حماية البَيضة والذبُّ عن الحريم؛ ليتصرّف الناس في المعايش، وينتشروا في الأسفار آمنين من تغريرٍ بنفس أو مال.

والرابع: إقامة الحدود؛ لتُصان محارمُ الله تعالى عن الانتهاك، وتُحفظ حقوق عباده من إتلافٍ واستهلاك.

والخامس: تحصين الثغور بالعدّة المانعة والقوّة الدافعة حتى لا تَظفر الأعداء بغِرَّةٍ ينتهكون فيها مُحرّمًا، أو يسفكون فيها لمسلم أو معاهد دمًا.

والسادس: جهاد من عانَدَ الإسلام بعد الدعوة حتى يُسلم أو يَدخل في الذمّة؛ ليُقام بحق الله تعالى في إظهاره على الدين كله.

والسابع: جباية الفيء والصدقات على ما أوجبه الشرع نصًّا واجتهادًا من غير خوفٍ ولا عَسْفٍ.

والثامن: تقدير العطايا وما يَستحقّ في بيت المال من غير َسَرفٍ ولا تقتيرٍ، ودفعه في وقتٍ لا تقديمَ فيه ولا تأخير.

والتاسع: استكفاء الأُمناء وتقليد النُّصحاء فيما يُفوَّض إليهم من الأعمال ويكِله إليهم من الأموال؛ لتكون الأعمال بالكفاءة مضبوطةً، والأموال بالأمناء محفوظة.

والعاشر: أن يباشر بنفسه مشَارفة الأمور، وتصفُّح الأحوال؛ لينْهَض بسياسة الأمّة وحراسة الملّة، ولا يعوِّل على التفويض تشاغلًا بلذَّةٍ أو عبادةٍ، فقد يخون الأمين ويَغُشّ النَّاصح، وقد قال الله تعالى: {يَا دَاوُدُ إنَّا جَعَلْنَاكَ خَلِيفَةً فِي الأَرْضِ فَاحْكُمْ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِالْحَقِّ وَلَا تَتَّبِعِ الْهَوَى فَيُضِلَّكَ عَنْ سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ}، فلم يقتصر اللّه سبحانه على التفويض دون المباشرة ولا عَذَرَه في الِاتِّباع حتى وصفه بالضلال، وهذا وإن كان مستحقًّا عليه بحكم الدين ومنصب الخلافة، فهو من حقوق السياسة لكل مُستَرْعٍ، قال النبي -عليه الصلاة والسلام: «كلكم راعٍ وكلكم مسئولٌ عن رعيّته».

 

The duties incumbent upon the Imam in matters of public concern are ten in number:

1. Preservation of the religion in accordance with its established principles and the consensus of the early generations of the Muslim Umma. Should a heretic arise or an individual deviate due to dubious reasoning, the Imam must present conclusive evidence, clarify the correct path, and apply the appropriate legal rights and penalties, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the religion and shielding the community from doctrinal error.
2. Enforcement of legal judgments and resolution of disputes among litigants, so that justice may be fully realized—ensuring that no oppressor exceeds his bounds and no victim is left without redress.
3. Defense of the territory and protection of the community’s sanctity, so that people may engage in their livelihoods and move about freely in travel, secure from threats to their lives or property.
4. Implementation of ḥadd penalties, so that the sanctities of Allah remain inviolate and the rights of His servants are protected from transgression and harm.¹¹
5. Fortification of the frontiers with sufficient defensive equipment and repelling force, so that the enemy does not seize upon a moment of vulnerability to violate sacred boundaries or to shed the blood of a Muslim or a legally protected non-Muslim (muʿāhid).¹²
6. Engagement in jihād against those who oppose Islam after having received its call, until they either embrace Islam or enter into a protected covenant (dhimma)—in order to uphold the right of Allah in manifesting His religion over all others.¹³
7. Collection of spoils (fayʾ) and alms in accordance with the prescriptions of the revealed law, whether by explicit texts or juristic reasoning, without coercion or injustice.¹⁴
8. Allocation of stipends and entitlements from the public treasury (bayt al-māl) without extravagance or miserliness, and disbursing them at their appointed time—neither prematurely nor with undue delay.
9. Selection of trustworthy officials and appointment of sincere advisors to oversee the duties delegated to them and the funds entrusted to them—so that administrative affairs are managed with competence, and public wealth is preserved through reliable custodianship.
10. Direct supervision of affairs and continual review of conditions, so that the Imam may effectively govern the community and protect the religion. He must not rely solely on delegation—whether due to indulgence in pleasure or preoccupation with worship—for even the trustworthy may betray and the sincere may be mistaken. As Allah, Exalted is He, says: “O Dāwūd, indeed We have made you a successor upon the earth, so judge between the people in truth and do not follow desire, for it will lead you astray from the path of Allah.”¹⁵ Allah did not consider delegation sufficient without direct involvement, nor did He excuse the mere following of desire; rather, He described it as misguidance. While this responsibility is incumbent upon the Imam by virtue of his religious duty and the office of the caliphate, it is also a matter of sound political governance incumbent upon anyone entrusted with authority. As the Prophet e said:¹⁶ “Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you is responsible for his flock.”¹⁷

 

Al-Māwardī, Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā

فهذه آثارُ السلطان في أحوال الدنيا وما ينتظمُ به أمورُها. ثمّ لِما في السلطان من حراسةِ الدينِ والدنيا والذبِّ عنهما ودفعِ الأهواءِ منه، وحراسةِ التبديلِ فيه، وزجرِ من شذَّ عنه بارتدادٍ، أو بَغَى فيه بعنادٍ، أو سَعَى فيه بفسادٍ. وهذه أمورٌ إن لم تَنحسم عن الدينِ بسلطانٍ قويٍّ ورعايةٍ وافيةٍ أسرعَ فيه تبديلُ ذوي الأهواء، وتحريفُ ذوي الآراء، فليس دينٌ زال سلطانُهُ إلَّا بُدِّلتْ أحكامُهُ، وطُمِسَتْ أعلامُهُ. وكان لكل زعيمٍ فيه بدعةٌ، ولكل عصرٍ فيه وِهايَةُ أثرٍ. كما أن السلطانَ إن لم يكن على دينٍ تجتمعُ به القلوبُ حتى يرى أهلُهُ الطاعةَ فيه فرضًا، والتناصرَ عليه حتمًا، لم يكن للسلطانِ لُبثٌ ولا لأيّامهِ صَفوٌ، وكان سلطانَ قهرٍ، ومَفسدةَ دهرٍ. ومن هذين الوجهين وجب إقامةُ إمامٍ يكون سلطانَ الوقتِ وزعيمَ الأمّةِ ليكون الدينُ محروسًا بسلطانهِ، والسلطانُ جاريًا على سننِ الدينِ وأحكامهِ. قال عبد الله بن المعتزِّ: المُلك بالدين يَبقى، والدين بالمُلك يَقوى.

These are the effects of political authority on worldly affairs and the order it brings to them.¹⁸ Governance protects both religion and worldly life: it shields them from distortion, repels the intrusion of misguided desires, guards against alteration, and restrains those who deviate—whether by apostasy, rebellious defiance, or acts of corruption. If such threats are not decisively checked by strong authority and sufficient oversight, the distortion of religious principles by those of passion and the misrepresentation of doctrine by those of [deviant] opinion would quickly follow. No religion whose political authority has collapsed has been spared the alteration of its rulings and the effacement of its defining features. In such cases, every leader introduces a new heresy, and every era of weakness leaves behind the traces of its decline.

Likewise, when political authority is not anchored in a religion that unites hearts—such that its adherents regard obedience as an obligation and mutual support as a binding duty—that authority cannot endure, nor will its reign be marked by felicity. It becomes a reign of coercion and a source of abiding corruption. For these two reasons,¹⁹ it is necessary to appoint an imam who serves as the sovereign of the time and the leader of the community—so that religion is protected by his rule, and governance proceeds according to the norms and rulings of the religion. As ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Muʿtazz said: “Kingship endures through religion, and religion is strengthened by kingship.”²⁰

 

Al-Juwaynī, al-Ghiyāthī

الإمامةُ رياسةٌ تامّة، وزِعامةٌ عامّة، تتعلق بالخاصّة والعامّة، في مُهمّاتِ الدين والدنيا. مُهمّتها حفظُ الحَوزة، ورعايةُ الرعيّة، وإقامةُ الدعوة بالحجّة والسيف، وكفُّ الخَيف والحَيف، والانتصافُ للمظلومين من الظالمين، واستيفاءُ الحقوقِ من المُمتنعين، وإيفاؤها على المُستحقّين.  […]فنصبُ الإمام عند الإمكان واجبٌ، وذهب عبد الرحمن بن كيسان إلى أنه لا يَجب، ويجوز ترك الناس أخيافًا، يَلتَطِمون ائتلافًا واختلافًا، لا يَجمعهم ضابطٌ، ولا يَربِط شتاتَ رأيِهم رابطٌ. وهذا الرجل هجومٌ على شقِّ العصا، ومقابلةِ الحقوقِ بالعُقوق، لا يَهابُ حجابَ الإنصاف، ولا يَستَوعرُ أصوابَ الاعتساف، ولا يُسمّى إلا عند الانسلال عن رِبقَةِ الإجماع، والحَيدِ عن سنن الاتباع، وهو مسبوقٌ بإجماعٍ من أشرقت عليه الشمس شارقةً وغاربةً، واتفاقِ مذاهب العلماء قاطبةً.

أمَا أصحابُ رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم رأوا البدارَ إلى نصبِ الإمامِ حقًّا، فتَركوا لسببِ التشاغلِ به تجهيزَ رسولِ الله ودفنه مَخافةَ أن تتغشّاهم هاجمةُ مِحنةٍ.

ولا يرتابُ مَن معه مُسكةٌ من عقلٍ أن الذبَّ عن الحَوزة، والنِضالَ دون حفظِ البَيضةِ محتومٌ شرعًا، ولو تُرك الناسُ فَوضى لا يَجمعهم على الحقِّ جامعٌ، ولا يَزعهم وازعٌ، ولا يَردعهم عن اتباعِ خطواتِ الشيطانِ رادعٌ، مع تَفنّنِ الآراء، وتفرّقِ الأهواء لانْتَثَرَ النظام، وهلك العظام، وتوَثَّبتِ الطَغام والعَوام، وتحزبّتِ الآراءُ المتناقضة، وتفرّقتِ الإرادات المتعارضة، ومَلَكَ الأرذلون سراةَ الناس، وفُضَّتِ المَجامع، واتّسع الخَرقُ على الراقع، وفَشَت الخصومات، واستَحْوذ على أهلِ الدين ذَوو العَرَامات، وتَبدّدتِ الجماعات، ولا حاجةَ إلى الإطنابِ بعد حصولِ البيان، وما يَزعُ الله بالسلطان أكثرُ مما يَزعُ بالقرآن.

The imamate is a comprehensive leadership and general authority that pertains to both the elite and the common people, and extends to the essential concerns of religion and worldly life.²¹ Its responsibilities include preserving the integrity of the community, ensuring the welfare of the populace, upholding the religious call (daʿwa) through both persuasion and authorized force, averting fear and injustice, securing justice for the oppressed against their oppressors, reclaiming rights from those who withhold them, and delivering them to those entitled.²²

The appointment of an imam, when possible, is an obligation.²³ ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Kaysān, however, held that it is not obligatory, and that it is permissible for people to remain in scattered factions, tossed between agreement and disagreement, without a unifying authority or any cohesive principle binding their divergent views.²⁴ This man is an advocate for division and the opposition of rights with wrongs. He shows no regard for the bounds of fairness and does not hesitate to pursue the path of injustice. He is mentioned only in contexts that signify a breach of consensus (ijmāʿ) and a deviation from the path of rightful adherence. His view stands in contradiction to the established consensus of all scholars across the lands where the sun rises and sets, and against the agreement of all schools of thought.

Indeed, the Companions of the Messenger of Allah e regarded the prompt appointment of an imam as a necessary obligation. Preoccupied with this task, they delayed the preparation and burial of the Messenger of Allah e, fearing that a sudden trial might descend upon them [if leadership were left unsettled].²⁵

No one possessing even a trace of sound reason would doubt that defending the religious domain and safeguarding the collective integrity of the community is a duty prescribed by the sharīʿa. Were people left in a state of lawlessness—with no leader to unite them upon the truth, no authority to restrain them, and no force to deter them from following the footsteps of Satan—the diversity of opinions and the divergence of passions would unravel the social order. The pillars of the community would collapse; the rabble and the ignorant would rise up; conflicting factions would multiply; opposing wills would splinter the public good; the ignoble would gain mastery over the noble; assemblies would be dissolved; the rupture would exceed the capacity of any to repair it; disputes would spread unchecked; the malicious would prevail over the devout; and communities would disintegrate.

There is no need to elaborate further once the truth has been made evident. Indeed, what Allah restrains through political authority is greater than what He curbs through the Qur’an alone.²⁶

ومن العبارات الرائقة الفائقة المُرضية في الإعراب عن المقاصد الكليّة في القضايا الشرعيّة أنّ مضمونها دعاءٌ إلى مَكارم الأخلاق ندبًا واستحبابًا، وحتمًا وإيجابًا، والزجرُ عن الفواحش وما يُخالف المعالي، تحريمًا وحظرًا، وكراهيةً تبين عِيَافَةً وحَجْرًا، وإباحةٌ تُغني عن الفواحش، كإباحةِ النكاح المُغني عن السِفاح، أو تُعين على الطاعة، وتُعضِد أسبابَ القوّة والاستطاعة.

ثمّ لمّا جُبِلت النفوسُ على حبِّ العاجل، والتطلّعِ إلى الضِنّةِ بالحاصل، والتعلقِ في تحصيل الدنيا بالوصائل والوسائل، والاستهانةِ بالمَهالك والغوائل، والتَهالكِ على جمعِ الحُطام من غيرِ تماسكٍ وتمالك، وهذا يجرُّ التنافسَ والازدحام، والنزاع والخصام، واقتحامَ الخطوبِ العظام، فاقتضى الشرع فَيصلاً بين الحلالِ والحرام، وإنصافًا وانتصافًا بين طبقاتِ الأنام، وتعليقَ الإقدامِ على القُرْب والطاعات بالفوز بالثواب، فيَربطُ اقتحامَ الآثام بالعقاب.

ثمّ لم يَنحَجِز معظم الناس عن الهوى بالوعد والوعيد، والترغيب والتهذيب، فقيَّض اللّه السلاطينَ وأولي الأمر وازِعين، لِيُوَفِّروا الحقوقَ على مُستحقّيها، ويُبلِغوا الحظوظَ ذَوِيها، ويَكُفوا المعتدين، ويُعَضٍّدوا المقتصدين، ويُشَيٍّدُوا مبانيَ الرشاد، ويُحسِموا معانيَ الغيِّ والفساد، فتنتظم أمورُ الدنيا، ويُستَمدُّ منها الدينُ الذي إليه المنتهى.

Among the most refined and eloquent formulations that effectively convey the overarching objectives of the sacred law is the recognition that its substance is, at its core, a call to noble character—at times by way of recommendation and encouragement, and at other times by way of obligation and command. It likewise involves a deterrence from indecencies and from that which contradicts virtuous conduct, through prohibition and restriction, as well as through disapproval that expresses aversion and imposes restraint. The law also includes permissions that serve to prevent indecency—such as the permissibility of marriage, which averts fornication—or that facilitate acts of obedience and reinforce the means of strength and capacity.

Since human nature is predisposed to the love of immediate gratification, to clinging tightly to what one possesses, and to seeking worldly gains through all available means and intermediaries—while showing little regard for dangers and perils, and recklessly pursuing the accumulation of wealth without restraint or self-possession—this breeds rivalry and jostling, quarrel and contention, and headlong plunges into grave calamities. In response, the sacred law established a clear criterion between the lawful and the unlawful, and instituted fairness and reciprocal justice among all classes of people. It also tied the pursuit of nearness to God and acts of obedience to the promise of reward, while linking the commission of sins to the threat of punishment.

Furthermore, most people are not restrained from their desires merely by promises and warnings, encouragements and moral refinement. Therefore, Allah appointed rulers and those in authority as enforcers—so that they may ensure rights are delivered to their rightful claimants, privileges reach those entitled to them, aggressors are restrained, the moderate are supported, the structures of guidance are reinforced, and the roots of misguidance and corruption are eradicated. In this way, the affairs of the world are properly ordered, and from that order, religion—toward which all aims ultimately converge—can be sustained.²⁷

وما ابتعثَ اللّه نبيًّا في الأممِ السالفة حتى أيّده وعضّده بسلطانٍ ذي عُدَّة ونَجْدَة، ومِن الرسل عليهم السلام مَن اجتمعت له النبوةُ والأيْدُ والقوّةُ كداودَ وموسى وسليمان – صلواتُ الله عليهم أجمعين. ولمّا اختَتم اللّه الرسالة في العالم بسيّد ولد آدم أيّده بالحجة البيضاء، والمَحجَّة الغَرَّاء، وشدَّ بالسيف أزْرَه، وضَمِن إظهارَه ونصرَه، وجعله إمامَ الدين والدنيا، ومَلاذَ الخلقِ في الآخرة والأولى، ثمّ أكمل اللّه الدين واختتم الوحي، فاستَأثَرَ برسوله سيّدِ النبيّين، فخَلَفَه أبو بكرٍ الصديقُ ليدعوَ إلى اللّه دُعَاهُ، ويُقرِّرَ من مصالح الدنيا ومراشِدِها، ويَنتَحِي في استصلاحِ العباد انتِحَاهُ.[…] فالقول الكليّ أنّ الغرَض استِيفاءُ قواعدِ الإسلام طوعًا أو كرهًا، والمقصدُ الدينُ، ولكنّه لمّا استمدَّ استمرارَه من الدنيا، كانت هذه القضيةُ مَرعِيّةً.

Allah did not send a prophet to any previous nations without supporting and strengthening him by an authority endowed with resources and succour. Among the messengers n were those who were given both prophethood, strength, and power, such as Dāwūd, Mūsā, and Sulaymān n. When Allah sealed His message to the world with the Master of the children of Adam (the Prophet Muhammad e), He supported him with the radiant proof and the clear path, reinforced him with the sword, guaranteed his manifest victory, and appointed him as the leader of both religious and worldly affairs, the refuge of creation in this life and the next. Then, when Allah completed the religion and sealed revelation, He took His Messenger e—the master of prophets—unto himself.²⁸ Thereafter, Abu Bakr al-Ṣiddīq f succeeded him: to call people to Allah’s path, to establish the worldly interests that support guidance, and to pursue the reform of humanity in the manner of the Prophet e.²⁹ […] In sum, the overarching objective is the fulfillment of the foundations of Islam—whether through voluntary acceptance or through compelled compliance under legitimate authority. Religion is the ultimate aim; but because its continuation depends on the order of worldly life, this dimension of political leadership becomes essential and worthy of attention.³⁰

 

Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād

ولا ينبغي أن تظنّ أنّ وجوب ذلك [نصب الإمام] مأخوذ من العقل، فإنّا بينّا أنّ الوجوب يُؤخذ من الشرع، إلا أن يُفسر الواجب بالفعل الذي فيه فائدة وفي تركه أدنى مَضرة، وعند ذلك لا يُنكر وجوب نصب الإمام لما فيه من الفوائد ودفع المضارّ في الدنيا، ولكنّا نقيم البرهان القطعي الشرعي على وجوبه ولسنا نكتفي بما فيه من إجماع الأمة، بل نُنبّه على مستنَد الإجماع ونقول: نظامُ أمر الدين مقصودٌ لِصاحب الشرع عليه السلام قطعاً، وهذه مقدمة قطعيّة لا يُتصور النزاع فيها، ونُضيف إليها مقدمة أخرى وهو أنه لا يَحصل نظام الدين إلا بإمام مُطاع، فيحصل من المقدمتين صحة الدعوى وهو وجوب نصب الإمام.

فإن قيل المقدمة الأخيرة غيرُ مسلّمة وهو أن نظام الدين لا يحصل إلا بإمام مطاع، فدَلّوا عليها. فنقول البرهان عليه أنّ نظام الدين لا يَحصل إلا بنظام الدنيا، ونظام الدنيا لا يحصل إلا بإمامٍ مطاعٍ، فهاتان مقدمتان ففي أيهما النزاع؟ فإن قيل لِمَ قلتم إنّ نظام الدين لا يحصل إلا بنظام الدنيا، بل لا يَحصل إلا بخراب الدنيا، فإنّ الدين والدنيا ضدّان والاشتغال بعمارةِ أحدهما خراب الآخر، قلنا هذا كلام من لا يفهم ما نريده بالدنيا الآن، فإنّه لفظ مشترك قد يُطلق على فضول التنعّم والتلذّذ والزيادة على الحاجة والضرورة، وقد يُطلق على جميع ما هو محتاج إليه قبل الموت. وأحدهما ضد الدين والآخر شرطُه، وهكذا يغلط من لا يميّز بين معاني الألفاظ المشتركة.

فنقول نظامُ الدين بالمعرفة والعبادة لا يُتوصل إليهما إلا بصحة البدن وبقاء الحياة وسلامة قدر الحاجّات من الكسوة والمسكن والأقوات، والأمن هو آخر الآفات، ولعَمري من أصبح آمنًا في سِربه معافًى في بدنه وله قُوت يومه فكأنّما حِيزت له الدنيا بحذافيرها، وليس يأمن الإنسان على روحه وبدنه وماله ومسكنه وقوته في جميع الأحوال بل في بعضها، فلا ينتظم الدين إلا بتحقيق الأمن على هذه المهمّات الضرورية، وإلا فمَن كان جميع أوقاته مستغرقًا بحراسة نفسه من سيوف الظَّلَمَة وطلب قوته من وجوه الغَلَبَة، متى يتفرغ للعلم والعمل وهما وسيلتاه إلى سعادة الآخرة، فإذن بانَ أنّ نظام الدنيا – أعني مقادير الحاجة – شرطٌ لنظام الدين.

One should not suppose that the obligation [to appoint an Imam] is derived from reason alone.³¹ We have already established that obligation is determined by revelation, unless one interprets “obligatory” as referring merely to an action whose performance yields benefit and whose omission entails some degree of harm. In that case, one may not deny the obligatoriness of appointing an imam, given the worldly benefits and the harms it prevents. Nevertheless, we offer a conclusive legal proof derived from revelation to establish its obligatory nature. We do not rely solely on the consensus of the Muslim community; rather we draw attention to the foundation of this consensus.³² We say: the proper ordering of religious affairs is unquestionably among the intended aims of the Lawgiver e. This is a definitive premise about which no disagreement is conceivable. To this we add a second premise: religious order cannot be established except through a leader (imam) who is obeyed. From these two premises, the conclusion necessarily follows: appointing an imam is obligatory.³³

Should it be said that the second premise is not conceded—namely, that religious order cannot be achieved except through an imam who is obeyed—so provide a proof for it, we respond: the proof for it is that religious order is not attained except through worldly order, and worldly order is not attained except through an imam who is obeyed. These are two premises: which one is in dispute? If it is said, “Why do you claim that religious order depends on worldly order? On the contrary, it is only attained through the ruin of worldly life, for religion and the world are opposites, and devoting oneself to the cultivation of one is the ruin of the other,” we reply: this is the statement of one who does not understand what we mean by “the world” in this context. The term is polysemous (mushtarak), and may denote either excessive indulgence in luxury, comfort, and superfluity beyond necessity, or everything one requires before death. One of these is indeed opposed to religion, while the other is a condition for it. Thus errs the one who fails to distinguish between the meanings of polysemous terms.

We say that the ordering of religion through knowledge and worship cannot be attained except with soundness of body, preservation of life, and the safeguarding of the necessary needs of clothing, shelter, and sustenance. Security is the final condition [needed to ward off harm]—for indeed (la–ʿamrī), “whoever wakes up secure in his dwelling, sound in body, and possessing his daily sustenance, it is as if the entire world has been gathered for him.”³⁴ Yet a person does not enjoy security over his life, body, wealth, home, and sustenance in all situations, only in some. Thus, religion cannot be properly ordered without achieving security in these essential matters.³⁵ Otherwise, one whose time is entirely consumed in guarding himself from the swords of tyrants and struggling to secure his subsistence, when will he have time for knowledge and worship, the two means to the felicity of the Hereafter? It therefore becomes clear that the ordering of worldly life—by which I mean the [fulfillment of] necessary needs—is a condition for the ordering of religion.³⁶

وأمّا المقدّمة الثانية، وهو أن الدنيا والأمن على الأنفس والأموال لا يَنتظم إلا بسلطانٍ مطاعٍ، فتشهد له مشاهدة أوقات الفتن بموت السلاطين والأئمّة، وإنّ ذلك لو دام ولم يُتداركْ بنصب سلطان آخر مطاع دام الهرْج وعمّ السيف وشملَ القحط وهلكت المواشي وبطلت الصناعات، وكان كلّ مَن غلبَ سلبَ، ولم يتفرّغ أحدً للعبادة والعلم إن بقي حيًا، والأكثرون يهلكون تحت ظلال السيوف، ولهذا قيل: الدين والسلطان تَوأَمان، ولهذا قيل: الدين أسٌّ والسلطان حارسٌ وما لا أسَّ له فمهدومٌ وما لا حارسَ له فضائعٌ.

وعلى الجملة لا يتمارى العاقل في أنّ الخلق على اختلاف طبقاتهم وما هم عليه من تشتّت الأهواء وتباين الآراء لو خُلُّوا وآراءَهم، ولم يكن لهم رأيٌ مطاعٌ يجمع شتاتهم، لهَلكوا من عند آخِرهم، وهذا داءٌ لا علاجَ له إلا بسلطان قاهر مطاع يجمع شتات الآراء، فبانَ أنّ السلطان ضروري في نظام الدنيا، ونظام الدنيا ضروري في نظام الدين، ونظام الدين ضروري في الفوز بسعادة الآخرة، وهو مقصودُ الأنبياء قطعًا، فكان وجوب نصب الإمام من ضروريّات الشرع الذي لا سبيل إلى تركه، فاعلمْ ذلك.

As for the second premise—that worldly life and security over lives and property cannot be properly ordered except through a ruler who is obeyed—this is borne out by what we witness in times of strife following the deaths of rulers and imams. If such a state were to persist without being remedied by appointing another obeyed authority, chaos would endure, the sword would prevail, famine would spread, livestock would perish, industries would come to a halt, and every act of domination would lead to plunder. No one would have the opportunity for worship or knowledge, if indeed they remained alive, while most would perish beneath the shadows of swords. It is for this reason that it has been said: “Religion and political authority are twins,” and likewise: “Religion is a foundation, and the ruler is its guardian. That which has no foundation is demolished, and that which has no guardian is lost.”

In sum, no rational person would doubt that humankind, given the diversity of their social ranks and the dispersion of their inclinations and divergence of views, if left to their own opinions without an authoritative will to unify their fragmentation, would ultimately perish. This is a malady for which there is no remedy except through a dominant and obeyed ruler who can consolidate divergent views. It thus becomes clear that rulership is indispensable for the ordering of worldly life; that the ordering of worldly life is indispensable for the ordering of religion; and that the ordering of religion is indispensable for attaining the felicity (saʿāda) of the Hereafter, which is without doubt the ultimate aim of the prophets.³⁷ It follows, therefore, that the obligation to appoint an imam is among the necessities of the revealed law, leaving no room for its neglect. Let this be clearly understood.³⁸

 

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Suggested citation:

Yousef Wahb, “Shāfiʿī Political Theorists on the Imamate: Māwardī, Juwaynī, and Ghazālī,” Ummatics, Dec 10, 2025, https://ummatics.org/papers/shafii-political-theorists-on-the-imamate/.