The prevailing discourse surrounding modernity has long been dominated by a singular, Eurocentric narrative, presenting itself as the universal blueprint for human progress and development. Deeply intertwined with the colonial enterprise, this has positioned Western civilization as the sole vanguard of enlightenment, often relegating non-Western cultures to a state of perpetual catch-up. However, decolonial thought interrogates these legacies of colonialism and Eurocentrism, transforming the very concept of modernity into a central battleground where alternative possibilities for human flourishing are sought.

This abridgment of a recently published journal article delves into this complex intellectual landscape, exploring the contrasting perspectives of two prominent thinkers: the Argentine-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel and the Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane.¹ While both share a profound commitment to decolonizing thought, they offer distinct approaches to understanding and engaging with modernity. I argue that Dussel’s incisive critique of Taha, while powerful and consistent, ultimately misreads the latter’s project as abstract universalism, thereby overlooking its nuanced decolonial logic and profound ethical specificity. By critically examining their dialogue, I aim to highlight Taha’s unique contribution to decolonial thought: an ethical and insurgent reimagining of modernity that is spiritually grounded, ethically transformative, and non-imitative, rooted in a creative engagement with indigenous traditions.

Dussel’s Uncompromising Critique: Modernity as a Eurocentric-Colonial Construct

Anchored in Latin America’s historical experience, Enrique Dussel’s philosophy of liberation exposes modernity’s intrinsic connection to colonial domination. His seminal work argues that the very fabric of European modernity was woven with violence, exploitation, the subjugation of the non-Western world, and the systematic erasure of other knowledge and ways of being. For him, modernity is not a universal stage of development but a singular European phenomenon whose claims to universality motivate colonial domination. He emphatically states that modernity and coloniality are two sides of the same coin; one cannot be understood without the other.

Dussel posits with unwavering force that modernity, as it has historically unfolded, is a “real, concrete, singular, unique event.”² He challenges Eurocentric genealogies that trace modernity to the Renaissance or Enlightenment, arguing instead that its constitutive moment was Europe’s Atlantic expansion in 1492, which inaugurated conquest, colonization, and a capitalist world-system. Modernity, in Dussel’s philosophy, is thus inseparable from coloniality; the former is not merely accompanied by the latter but is fundamentally built upon it, sustained by it, and defined through it. Modernity and coloniality are inseparable: Europe’s modernization was possible only through colonial plunder, enslaved labor, and the relegation of other civilizations to a dominated periphery. Dussel further shows how Europe appropriated and concealed non-European knowledges (Chinese, Islamic, and others) while constructing the myth of its self-sufficient modernity. In turn, he calls for what he terms “a trans-modernity, in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual creative fertilization,” envisioning a liberatory project anchored in “analectics”—an ethics of inclusive solidarity. This vision culminates in his call for pluriversality, a horizon where multiple epistemic and cultural worlds coexist without subsumption into a single universalist logic.³

It is from this deeply critical and historically informed vantage point that Dussel interprets and ultimately critiques Taha’s proposal for multiple modernities. Dussel understands Taha to be suggesting that these multiple modernities can be deduced a priori from a conceptual “spirit of modernity” (rūḥ al-ḥadātha), which Taha defines through three core principles: intellectual maturity (rushd), critique (naqd), and universality (shumūl). Dussel characterizes Taha’s methodological path as a kind of Hegelian “descent from identity to its differences,” where the “spirit of modernity” functions as an abstract universal concept that can then be applied a posteriori to generate different historical and cultural actualizations.⁴

This interpretation forms the bedrock of Dussel’s critique: he sees Taha’s approach as dangerously proximate to the “developmentalist fallacy”—the misleading notion that non-Western societies can achieve modernity by following “the same path or route that modern, colonialist Europe traversed.”⁵ Dussel fears that conceiving modernity as an abstract structure or set of principles that can be simply “applied” or “adapted” by other cultures risks overlooking the unique, violent, and unrepeatable historical trajectory and inherent coloniality of actual European modernity. Therefore, Dussel asserts with conviction that “there has not been and there will not be another modernity” in the sense of replicating or successfully applying the singular European event, because that event was defined by its position as the colonial center. He considers any attempt by a peripheral culture to achieve modernity on these terms to be a Sisyphean task doomed to failure and further subjugation.⁶

Taha Abderrahmane’s Ethical Reimagining: Connected Creativity and Pluriversal Modernities

The work of contemporary Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane emerges as a significant voice, offering a profound and original critique of Western modernity from an ethical Islamic perspective. Taha challenges the hegemony of the Western model of modernity not by simply rejecting it, but by deconstructing its claims and proposing an alternative pathway to societal flourishing. He advocates for the possibility of multiple ethically grounded modernities rooted in diverse civilizational traditions, with a particular focus on the Islamic tradition. His project is one of intellectual and spiritual reorientation, seeking to reclaim and reactivate the creative potential inherent within the Islamic turāth (tradition/heritage) to forge an authentic, non-imitative, and ethically sound modernity. I will first present his argument before returning to engage Dussel’s critique of it.

At the core of his project are al-mawāthīq al-thalātha (the Three Covenants), which ground ethical subjectivity in an Islamic framework: shahāda (testimony of divine lordship), amāna (trust entailing moral responsibility and stewardship), and risāla (which amalgamates the entrusted prophetic message with self-purification, thus entailing self-rectification and communal uplift).⁷ Together, they form the spiritual grammar of the “New Human,” rooted in remembrance, responsibility, and renewal. Central to Taha’s ambitious intellectual project is his fundamental and oft-repeated distinction between the “spirit” (rūḥ) of modernity and its historically contingent “reality” or “manifestations” (wāqiʿ).⁸ For Taha, the spirit of modernity is not a uniquely Western invention; rather, it encompasses universal principles, values, and aspirations that have discernible roots in humanity’s intellectual, ethical, and spiritual strivings across diverse cultures and historical epochs. These foundational principles include rational autonomy, the imperative of critical inquiry, and a striving for comprehensiveness or universality in the application of knowledge and values. However, the reality of modernity, as it has predominantly manifested, is the specific Euro-American instantiation. Taha argues that this Western manifestation has achieved a hegemonic status, illegitimately conflating its particular historical form with the universal spirit itself, thereby obscuring or denying the possibility of other, equally valid, and potentially more ethically sound modernities emerging from different civilizational matrices.

Taha elaborates the spirit of modernity through three core, interconnected principles:

• Intellectual Maturity (rushd): a transition from dependence and uncritical acceptance to rational autonomy and independent judgment. While echoing Kant’s enlightenment ideal, Taha situates it within an Islamic ethical framework, where autonomy is bound to moral responsibility and spiritual awareness rather than unfettered individualism.⁹
• Critique (naqd): the commitment to base knowledge, belief, and practice on evidence and continuous critical examination. It stands against taqlīd (unthinking imitation) and affirms intellectual dynamism, courage to question, and the pursuit of truth and justice.¹⁰
• Universality (shumūl): the extension of values and ethical imperatives beyond their origins, while rejecting hegemonic universalism. Taha envisions a “universality of the heterogeneous,” where shared human concerns allow multiple authentic expressions to coexist—including more than one version of Islamic modernity.¹¹

Crucially for Taha, modernity is defined by creativity (ibdāʿ), not by institutions or technology. The “essence” of modernity is a dynamic process of “connected creativity” (ibdāʿ mawṣūl), innovation organically rooted in the turāth and discursive practices of a community. This creativity renews without rupture, translating principles into practices that enhance justice and human flourishing. This profound emphasis on creativity is inextricably linked to Taha’s pivotal concepts of authenticity (aṣāla) and heritage (turāth). He argues that genuine authenticity (aṣāla) arises through creative engagement with turāth, not passive inheritance or imitation of foreign models.¹² For Taha, turāth is a living reservoir of values and discourses that must fuel contemporary innovation, thus ensuring self-determination and guarding against alienation and dependency.

From this philosophical foundation, Taha mounts a critique of Western modernity’s dominant manifestations. He highlights its materialism, dehumanizing instrumental reason (ʿaql mujarrad/ʿaql ādātī), and ethical deficiencies as distortions of modernity’s true spirit.¹³ He argues that these flaws are not intrinsic to modernity itself but to its Western form, which has prioritized power over ethics, possession over being, and technical mastery over spiritual wisdom. He further critiques its secularizing tendencies, which he sees as fostering a spiritual void and loss of meaning. Yet his stance is not a wholesale rejection of the West but a discerning engagement, learning from its achievements while resisting its pathologies in order to construct a more holistic, ethically grounded modernity. For Taha, this requires integrating instrumental reason into a “broader rationality” that nurtures values and draws on the distinct spiritual sensibility of Islamic civilization.

Misreading the Rūḥ: Dussel, Taha, and the Limits of Decolonial Critique

While Dussel’s critique is undeniably rooted in a consistent and powerful decolonial framework, his interpretation of Taha constitutes a misreading of the more nuanced aspects of the latter’s philosophical project. The core of the divergence lies in their differing conceptualizations of modernity’s essence, its relationship to universality and particularity, and the role of tradition in forging alternative futures.

Dussel’s primary concern is that Taha’s concept of multiple modernities risks falling into the developmentalist fallacy and can be easily co-opted by hegemonic forces, thereby neutralizing its decolonial potential. However, Dussel’s reading does not fully capture the depth and specificity of Taha’s argument. Taha’s crucial distinction between the spirit and the reality of modernity is not, as Dussel seems to imply, about abstracting disembodied principles and applying them mechanically. Instead, it is a profound hermeneutical and ethical move designed to reclaim the potentialities which Taha, working within an Islamic discursive-pragmatic field, sees as inherent in the human fiṭra—an innate, prelapsarian metaphysical memory inscribed with divine truths. Taha explicitly links the pillars of the spirit of modernity (independence, creativity, rationalization, specification, expansion, generalization) to primordial human qualities (freedom, discernment, mutual recognition) inherent in the fiṭra.¹⁴

This reveals a fundamental ontological divergence between Taha and Dussel concerning the nature of modernity. For Dussel, whose project remains deeply embedded in a historical-materialist reconstruction of coloniality, modernity constitutes a historical event anchored in the geopolitical rupture of 1492 and the ensuing formation of a Eurocentric world system. By contrast, Taha does not treat modernity as an event in the historical sense but rather as an abstract ethical value (qīma akhlāqiyya) that reflects a certain mode of being, knowing, and acting in the world. His critique targets not merely the historical consequences but the underlying epistemic-moral ontology that animates modernity. By linking the core principles of modernity’s spirit—the capacity for reason, ethical reflection, and creative innovation—to fiṭra, Taha posits these capacities as fundamental and ingrained qualities of human nature. For him, the spirit of modernity is not a pre-packaged European model to be imitated but represents universal human potential that must be realized authentically through the unique cultural, linguistic, and ethical resources of each tradition. The goal is to cultivate a different kind of modernity, organically rooted in one’s own heritage and ethically oriented towards justice and human flourishing, through a “dialectical process that forms something new out of what already exists through a process of overturning (inqilāb).”¹⁵

Furthermore, Taha has clarified his position by emphasizing that his focus is on the “orientation” of modernity’s spirit, not its historically contingent Western “structure”. Preoccupied with the exploitative structure of European modernity, Dussel’s critique may have missed Taha’s call for a fundamental reorientation of human endeavor—one that is ethically grounded, spiritually informed, and draws sustenance from the living resources of the Islamic tradition. Taha’s project is not about adopting the Western model, even in a modified form; it is about reorienting the very foundations of modernity towards ethical ends, guided by a different set of values and priorities. While Taha’s framework incorporates concepts with a discernible Western philosophical lineage (e.g., rushd resonating with Kantian enlightenment), dismissing his project as a mere rehash of Western thought would be to overlook the transformative way in which Taha reappropriates, re-signifies, and re-embeds these concepts within a distinctly Islamic ethical and epistemological framework. His use of such concepts is tactical and dialogical, aiming to engage with Western thought while deconstructing its hegemonic claims and opening conceptual space for tradition-rooted perspectives.

Taha Abderrahmane and the Prospects of “Islamic Decoloniality”

When Taha’s philosophy is read beyond Dussel’s specific critique, its value to the broader decolonial theoretical project becomes apparent. His intellectual endeavor resonates deeply with the core aims of decolonizing knowledge, being, and power. It offers a robust, ethically grounded, and philosophically sophisticated framework for challenging Eurocentric hegemony and envisioning alternative pathways to human flourishing anchored in non-Western ethical and epistemological foundations, particularly those derived from the Islamic turāth.

Taha deconstructs Western modernity’s claims to universality, superiority, and inevitability, exposing its materialism, reliance on detached instrumental reason, ethical deficits, and corrosive impact on spirituality and the environment. His critique resonates with decolonial concerns about epistemic violence and Eurocentric arrogance. Against this backdrop, he insists that genuine renewal must arise from a creative, ethically grounded engagement with heritage. Central here are his concepts of ibdāʿ (creativity) and ijtihād (independent reasoning), envisioned as processes that generate new meanings from within the turāth. This praxis-oriented creativity links theory (naẓar) to action (ʿamal), offering a decolonial pathway for non-Western cultures to forge authentic modernities. Notably, Taha also reimagines translation as a philosophical-ethical act—a form of resistance against dependency and imitation that enables genuine modernization and liberation.

He also fundamentally challenges and dismantles the linear-progressive conception of time inherent in the Western narrative of modernity, which positions the West as the vanguard of history. He disrupts this colonial temporality by redefining modernity not as a future state to be achieved by mimicking the West, nor as a specific historical period, but as a potentiality inherent in the ethical and creative engagement with one’s past and present. By locating the spirit of modernity in enduring principles such as rushd, naqd, and shumūl, he opens up the possibility of multiple, co-existing modernities and alternative historical trajectories, liberating non-Western societies from the teleology of Western historicism.

While Dussel is wary of Taha’s principle of universality, Taha reconfigures identity and truth by unmooring them from metaphysical fixity. For him, the self is a flow of differences, alterity precedes identity, and truth unfolds plurally through multiple forms of reason. He sees reason as a lived, ethically and historically conditioned activity and distinguishes between its various types: demonstrative, argumentative, abstracted, guided, and supported. Against colonial epistemology, Taha grounds knowledge in plurality and ethics, promoting cooperative global society through what he calls “valuational rationality.” His vision is not a new totalizing universalism but a “universality of the heterogeneous.” Unlike Dussel, who rejects universalism outright, Taha seeks to reclaim it from within an Islamic ethical worldview, what I term “pluriversalities of rationality.” His Mīthāq al-Irsāl (covenant of the entrusted message) embeds universalism not in domination but in masʾūliyya ʿalā al-tablīgh (responsibility of conveying), oriented toward awakening the fiṭra (innate moral consciousness). Thus, Taha’s universalism is dialogical, pluralizing, spiritually grounded, and structurally open to other rationalities.

Finally, Taha offers a comprehensive ethical grounding for both critiquing modernity and for the project of decolonial reconstruction itself. His unwavering insistence that true modernity must be, above all, an ethical modernity rooted in spiritual values, moral responsibility, trusteeship (amāna, al-iʾtimāniyya), the cultivation of virtuous character (akhlāq), and a commitment to justice (ʿadl) and mercy (raḥma), provides a powerful alternative to purely secular, materialist, or power-centric approaches to decolonization. His trusteeship paradigm, emphasizing humanity’s responsibility as stewards of creation and bearers of ethical obligations towards God, self, others, and the environment, offers a holistic and integrative framework for rethinking social, political, economic, and personal life. This paradigm re-embeds reason within an ethical and spiritual matrix, challenging the instrumentalization of reason that characterizes much of Western modernity.

Taha’s philosophy not only challenges Eurocentric dominance but also unsettles the very anti-universalist premises on which Dussel’s pluriversal framework rests. The divergence between Taha and Dussel is not merely a matter of emphasis within decolonial thought but of fundamentally distinct epistemological orientations. Dussel’s critique of Taha conflates ethical universalism with abstract developmentalism; in fact, Taha’s project is an insurgent reorientation of modernity’s core values through Islamic epistemology, emphasizing praxis, spiritual accountability, and pluriversal coexistence. His position resists Eurocentrism while also interrogating the grounds of anti-universalism itself, suggesting that a universal horizon need not emerge from domination.

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Suggested Citation:

Achraf Idrissi, “Of Ethical Modernities: A Decolonial Dialogue between Taha Abderrahmane and Enrique Dussel,” Ummatics, May 4, 2026, http://ummatics.org/ethical-modernities.

Achraf Idrissi

Achraf G. Idrissi is an Assistant Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at Abu Dhabi University. With academic and professional experience spanning Europe, Indonesia, and Morocco, his research is rooted in interdisciplinary scholarship, decolonial ethics, and cross-cultural pedagogy. Previously, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center of Islam and Global Challenges at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), where he worked on decolonial Islamic ethics, diplomacy, and global governance. He completed a Ph.D. in Cultural Studies from the University of Debrecen, Hungary in 2024, exploring Islamicate ambassadorial reports in early modern Mediterranean diplomacy.

1. As an abridgement, the present article summarizes arguments and minimizes citations. For the fuller articulation, see the original article: Achraf Guennouni Idrissi, “Misreading the Rūḥ: Taha Abderrahmane, Enrique Dussel and the Ethics of Decolonial Modernities,” Postcolonial Studies (2025): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2025.2546187.
2. Enrique Dussel, “Are Many Modernities Possible? A South-South Dialogue,” in Decolonizing Ethics: The Critical Theory of Enrique Dussel, ed. Amy Allen and Eduardo Mendieta (University Park, USA: Penn State University Press, 2021), 25.
3. Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures),” Boundary 20, no. 3 (1993): 76.
4. Dussel, “Are Many Modernities Possible?,” 25–30.
5. Dussel, “Are Many Modernities Possible?,” 29.
6. Dussel, “Are Many Modernities Possible?,” 37.
7. Mohamed Hashas, “Taha Abderrahmane’s Trusteeship Paradigm,” in Islamic Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm: Taha Abderrahmane’s Philosophy in Comparative Perspectives, ed. Mohamed Hashas and Mutaz al-Khatib (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 47.
8. Taha Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha: al-Madkhal ilā Taʾsīs al-Ḥadātha al-Islāmiyya, 3^rd ed.(Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2013), 25–26.
9. Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha, 19.
10. Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha, 26–28.
11. Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha, 28–30.
12. Harald Viersen, The Time of Turāth: Authenticity and Temporality in Contemporary Arab Thought (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2024), 353.
13. Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha, 46.
14. Taha Abderrahmane, Rūḥ al-Dīn: Min Ḍīq al-ʿAlmāniyya ilā Saʿat al-Iʾtimāniyya, 4^th ed. (al-Dār al-Baydāʾ: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2017), 52.
15. Harald Viersen, “Rethinking Reform: ʿAbd al-Rahmān Tāhā and the Temporal Reconceptualization of the Authenticity–Modernity Paradigm,” Religions 14, no. 2 (2023): 10.