Description

The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 signalled more than the end of a political institution—it marked the dismantling of a centuries-old framework of transnational Muslim authority. In its place, the newly formed Turkish Republic constructed the Diyanet, a state-controlled religious body designed to domesticate Islam within the boundaries of a secular-national project. This transformation reoriented the relationship between religion and power, replacing the symbolic and legal universality of the caliphate with a centralized, bureaucratic apparatus that could both manage and contain Islamic life. Far from being an isolated case, this shift reflects a broader pattern in modern governance, in which states nationalize religious authority to align faith with state-defined interests. Examining the Kemalist project offers insight into how Muslim identity was redefined under secular oversight, how intra-Muslim diversity was reframed through state structures, and how the loss of transnational institutions continues to shape the possibilities—and limits—of Ummatic unity and Islamic political imagination today.   Dr. Emir Kaya is a Professor and head of the Department of General Public Law at Ankara Social Sciences University. His scholarship spans the intersections of religion, law, and the modern state, with particular focus on Turkey’s secular governance model and its reconfiguration of Islamic authority. Holding a Ph.D. in Law from SOAS, University of London, an M.A. in Theology from Harvard University, and a B.A. in Political Science and Philosophy from Indiana University–Bloomington, Dr. Kaya brings both legal expertise and theological depth to his work. He has served as a rapporteur judge at the Constitutional Court of Turkey and as a legal advisor at the Ministry of National Education. His book, Secularism and State Religion in Modern Turkey: Law, Policy-Making and the Diyanet, offers a comprehensive study of how the Diyanet was shaped into a cornerstone of Turkey’s Islamo-secular governance. The discussion and subsequent Q&A session was moderated by Dr. Usaama al-Azami, Hamad Bin Khalifa University Saturday September 27 at 12 PM (noon) Eastern Time ‎ ‎‎ ‎

Colloquium summary

Main Presentation

Setting the Stage

• The Diyanet might be the most significant and indispensable government department in Turkey.
• This topic must be situated in the aftermath of the Ottoman Caliphate’s abolition and the radical reforms of the early Turkish Republic.
• While secularist views on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tend to be consistent, framing him as the nation’s savior and progenitor of the modern republic, Muslim views are more complex, ranging from positive portrayals of a sincere revivor of Islam to negative portrayals of an enemy of Islam.
• The central question to be addressed is: how did the Kemalist regime deal with Islam after abolishing the caliphate in 1924?

 

Abolition of the Caliphate the Establishment of the Turkish Nation-State

• On March 3, 1924, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s government abolished the Ottoman caliphate.
• This removed a centuries-old institution that had served as a central symbol of Islamic unity and authority.
• Not all of Atatürk’s policies were against Islam: rather, the state redefined Islam’s role in the new republic, encouraging and discouraging particular dimensions to control Islam and use it in service of the secular nationalist project.
• Turkish national identity was conceived in secular nationalist terms, suppressing minority identities such as Kurds, Arabs, and Circassians, as well as the Islamic component of Turkish identity.
• The function of the Ottoman office of Şeyhülislâm—representing Islam’s role in the state—was divided among five modern-day government departments: justice, primary education, higher education, endowments, and religious affairs.

 

Establishment of the Diyanet

• On March 3, 1924, within hours of abolishing the caliphate, the state established the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to regulate Islam.
• This body reported directly to the prime minister’s office, signaling its integration into the highest levels of government.
• What Diyanet does:
  • Administration of all (90,000) mosques.
  • Administration of all (22,000) official Qur’an schools.
  • Employs nearly 150,000 members of staff.
  • Enjoys a larger budget than most major ministries.
  • Specialized training for personnel.
  • Publications and broadcasting (TV and radio).
  • Social aid and charity work.
  • Religious guidance and iftāʾ—the result of which is the effective emergence of a parallel legal system in Turkey in many areas of law, especially family and commercial law.
  • Pilgrimage and other religious services.
  • International activities (mainly in Europe): not only religious guidance but also social causes (e.g. fighting addiction) and as a cultural and diplomatic tool of the Turkish state abroad.
• The Diyanet’s functions include:
  • Supervising mosques and imams.
  • Controlling sermons and religious publications.
  • Handling appointments and discipline of clergy.
  • Guiding Islamic practice in line with the republic’s principles.
• The Diyanet’s legal status:
  • Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution establishes Turkey as a secular republic.
  • Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution establishes Diyanet as a “depoliticized” secular national government department charged not with serving Islam but rather with managing
  • Article 89 of the 1983 Political Parties Act prohibits party propaganda against the Diyanet—more actively enforced than campaigning against other constitutionally established bodies, such as the constitutional court or other state organs; led to the closure of the Freedom and Democracy Party in 1993.
• The Diyanet as a tool of control:
  • Personnel: Imams as civil servants on the state payroll.
  • Doctrinal Oversight: Sermons (khuṭbas) centrally drafted and tightly regulated.
  • Education: Religious education brought under tight secular supervision.
  • Suppression of Autonomy: Independent religious groups (notably Sufi ṭarīqas) were initially banned or restricted.

 

Tensions in the Logic of “National Islam”

• Kemalist leadership sought to cultivate a “national Islam”—Islam domesticated under state control to serve nationalism, modernization, and loyalty to the republic.
• This meant stripping Islam of universalist, supranational claims (e.g. pan-Islamism) and rebranding it as a cultural-moral resource compatible with Turkish nationhood.
• Although the republic claimed secularism, it also administered Islam through the Diyanet—creating a paradox.
• Islam was depoliticized in theory, but instrumentalized in practice: used to legitimize the new order, strengthen nationalism, and stabilize society.
• Over time, this model left Islam subordinate to state power, but also politicized the Diyanet itself.

 

Legacy of the Diyanet

• The Diyanet was neither a product of ideological commitment to laicism, nor capitulation to Islamist pressure; neither was it a liberal creation, nor the result of a Muslim demand. Rather, it was a pragmatic state instrument for addressing and managing Muslims.
• The Diyanet neither challenges traditional Muslim orthodoxy, nor the regime or successive governments, thus maintaining its position between both.
• The Diyanet became a durable institution that outlived the early republican elite.
• Later governments continued to use it, sometimes expanding its authority or shifting its messaging to align with their political agendas.
• Key legacy: Islam in Turkey remains entangled with the state, not in a clerical sense, but in a bureaucratic and political one.

 

Discussion and Q&A

The State-Religion Paradox

• Regarding secularism’s ability to coexist with such heavy state control over religion, Turkish secularism (laiklik) is not about exclusion of religion, but about a statist, managerial subordination of religion to state authority.
• The reason why the state considers the Diyanet to be sacrosanct and protected from criticism is not out of protectiveness of Islam, but rather out of a critical need to maintain the state’s control of Islam.

 

Evolution of the Diyanet After Atatürk

• The Diyanet changed after the early one-party era, with successive governments repurposing the institution:
  • Under the drive for Turkification, it endorsed the Turkification of the call to prayer (1932–1950), but not the prayer itself.
  • In the 1950s, with the rise of multi-party politics, Islam re-entered the public sphere.
  • Later regimes used the Diyanet to harness Islamic identity for electoral gain.
  • Under recent AKP governments, the Diyanet relaxed its commitment to narrow Turkish nationalism and has expanded its influence domestically and internationally.
  • Under a potential post-AKP government of more secular orientation, the Diyanet’s role may be repurposed, but not weaponized against Islam as such.
• Operating within the state, the Diyanet has its limits: the impressive academic work, the İslâm Ansiklopedisi, published by the Diyanet endowment, lacked an entry for “Kurd” in its earlier editions.

 

Sufi Ṭarīqas and Alternative Forms of Islam

• Diyanet staff may belong to a Sufi ṭarīqa but may not publicize or promote such affiliations, nor may a Sufi ṭarīqa exert influence over the Diyanet.
• Only official traditional educational institutions under the secular state—İmam Hatip schools and İlahiyat Fakültesi—are publicly sanctioned.
• Though Sufi ṭarīqas were suppressed under Atatürk and the subsequent government, the Diyanet did not acknowledge the suppression then, neither does it acknowledge the lack of suppression today.
• The survival of Sufi ṭarīqas underscores the limits of the Diyanet’s monopoly, even as it dominates the official religious sphere.
• Prior to the 1950s, anti-secularist figures such as Mustafa Sabri and Said Nursi were criminalized as enemies of the regime, but under the AKP government, the Diyanet has come to the point of publishing their works.

 

Islamic Law and State Law

• There are areas where Islamic law—reflected in Diyanet-issued fatwas—and state law clash.
• This may have the long-term effect of undermining the state.
• An argument can thus be made—even from the perspective of sociology, not necessarily Islam as such—that state recognition of Islamic law as a social fact would strengthen the state.

 

Institutional Legitimacy and Public Reception

• Though imams were not state-appointed during the Ottoman period, they were required to have graduated from the traditional madrasa
• Responses have been mixed regarding the extent to which ordinary believers trust the Diyanet’s Islamic authority:
  • Many see state-appointed imams as legitimate, especially when the Diyanet provides consistent access to Islamic religious services.
  • Others view state-controlled Islam as inauthentic, preferring alternative Islamic authorities.

 

Comparisons with Other Countries

• Liberal European states often see merits in state-controlled mosques and Islamic institutions, but fear that taking such measures would render these states illiberal.
• Whereas many states regulate religion, Turkey’s creation of the Diyanet’s centralized bureaucratic authority is relatively unique in scope and durability, especially when compared to the relative bureaucratic incompetence of repressive states such as Egypt.
• Some parallels exist with Iran’s clerical oversight (though with opposite ideological orientation), or with certain Arab states’ control of Friday sermons.

 

The Failure of Islamism?

• Some argue that Islamism’s future prospects in Turkey are weak: after the AKP’s failures, people are less likely to support Islamism.
• However, the AKP is essentially and methodologically Kemalist: while “Kemalist Islamism” is a failure, more authentic versions may yet succeed grounded in Islam’s unique capacity for social solidarity, philosophical and ideological grounding, and leadership.
• Prospects of a more timid Diyanet is a thing of the past, not the future.

 

The Diyanet and the Gaza Genocide

• Sermons (khuṭbas) are centrally drafted and unified across the country.
• While the sentiment towards Palestine is genuinely felt, the government is nervous about allowing open expression, which would undermine its relationship with Western countries, particularly the U.S.
• Thus, the Diyanet engages in self-censorship to align with government policy.

 

Broader Lessons

• Turkey may play a future role in ummatic leadership but would be in a better position to do so by deemphasizing Turkish identity, especially in light of significant Kurdish and Arab populations domestically.
• The state’s perceived lack of justice and bad political and economic performance combined with its performative religiosity has led some youth to view Islam negatively, sometimes to the point of abandoning Islam.
• Turkey’s case informs global debates on religion and modern state-building.
• Attempts to eliminate religion are often impractical; co-optation and control can stabilize a regime but also create long-term tensions about authenticity, legitimacy, and politicization.